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Did F. A. Hayek Embrace Popperian 
Falsificationism ? – A Critical Comment About 
Certain Theses of Popper, Duhem and Austrian 
Methodology 
 
Resumen 
 
La perspectiva metodológica de Hayek a la hora de 
investigar el ciclo comercial se acercaba más al 
apriorismo praxeológico que al falsificacionismo 
popperiano. Una consideración de la tesis de Duhem 
destaca el hecho de que, incluso desde una perspectiva 
metodológica común, el falsificacionismo es más 
problemático de lo que se suele pensar. A pesar de que 
las líneas de argumentación praxeológicas y comunes 
rechazan el énfasis popperiano en la falsificación por 
distintos motivos y desde un fondo distinto, las 
perspectivas del falsificacionismo en la metodología 
económica no parecen ser nada prometedoras. 
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duhemiano; Prueba de teorías; Significado e 
interpretación de resultados econométricos; Correlación y 
causalidad; 
 
Abstract 
The author of this article argues that Hayek´s 
methodological outlook at the time he engaged in business 
cycle research was actually closer to praxeological 
apriorism than to Popperian falsificationism. A 
consideration of the Duhem thesis highlights the fact 
that even from a mainstream methodological perspective 
falsificationism is more problematic than is often 
realized. Even if the praxeological and mainstream lines 
of argumentation reject the Popperian emphasis on 
falsification for different reasons and from a different 
background, the prospects for falsificationism in 
economic methodology seem rather bleak. 
Key words 
General methodology; Austrian methodology; 
falsificationism; Popper; Hayek; Duhem; Duhemian 
Argument; Testing of Theories; Meaning and Interpretation 
of Econometric Results; Correlation and Causality; 
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1. Introduction 
 
In his remarkable intellectual biography of F. A. 
von Hayek, Hans Jörg Hennecke (2000, 83) contends that 
F. A. Hayek, at the time he engaged in business cycle 
research and in particular when he wrote Monetary Theory 
and the Trade Cycle (Hayek [1933] 1966), had 
independently reached a falsificationist methodological 
position.  
A closer reading and analysis of the text of the 
first chapter of Hayek´s Monetary Theory and the Trade 
Cycle (Hayek [1933] 1966) reveals that Hayek was not 
defending the view, commonly ascribed to Popper, that 
theoretical propositions are (sometimes) falsified, or at 
least, should conceivably be falsifiable, on the basis of 
statistical or empirical evidence.1  
A few methodological issues considered relevant in 
the context of a critical examination of Popper´s 
falsificationism are discussed first. 
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2. A reminder: Popper´s falsificationism 
 
The philosopher K. R. Popper made a career and 
became famous on the basis of his rejection of induction 
and his elaborate defence of the thesis that a hypothesis 
is only scientific if it is capable of being proved false 
by observation. The doctrine of falsifiability asserts 
that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory 
is its falsifiability or refutability, not its 
verifiability or confirmability. 
Popper´s proposal of falsifiability as a criterion 
of demarcation was first launched in his The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery. ([1959] 1980) This proposal was 
based upon an asymmetry between verifiability and 
falsifiability. This asymmetry results from the logical 
form of universal statements since these are never 
derivable from singular statements, but can be 
contradicted by singular statements. Consequently it is 
possible by means of purely deductive inferences - with 
the help of the modus tollens of classical logic - to 
argue from the truth of singular statements to the 
falsity of universal statements. Such an argument to the 
falsity of universal statements is the only strictly 
deductive kind of inference that proceeds, as it were, in 
 6 
the “inductive direction”; that is, from singular to 
universal statements. (Popper [1959] 1980, ch. I)  
Thus according to Popper, there is no induction, 
because there is no way of deducing universal statements 
from singular statements. His own approach seemed to 
offer the advantage that it formulated a critical method 
for science which proceeded through trial and the 
correction of error. Therefore “testability is 
falsifiability”. (Popper [1963] 2002, 48) Falsifiability 
by potential negative instances is claimed to play a 
distinguished role to the exclusion of inductive 
supportability or probabilistic confirmability by 
positive instances. 
It was in fact soon recognized that Popper´s 
falsificationist methodology raised several problems 
which were never completely solved by Popper himself. 
Among these the issues raised by the Duhemian argument, 
which is considered further, remain most challenging to 
falsificationists.2 
To summarize, Popper´s methodological position can 
be characterized as a variant of methodological monism. 
Methodological monism amounts to the claim that 
scientific explanation and prediction are always of one 
and the same logical structure, in the sciences of nature 
no less than in the sciences of human action and society. 
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A clear statement of Popper´s methodological monism can 
be found in his The Poverty of Historicism in a section 
entitled “The Unity of Method”. (Popper [1957] 1994, 130 
ff.) Popper does not deny that there may be some 
differences between the methods of the theoretical 
sciences of nature and of society. According to Popper, 
however, the methods in the two fields are fundamentally 
the same. The methods always consist in offering 
deductive causal explanations, and in testing them by way 
of predictions. This method of hypothesis as it is often 
called does not achieve absolute certainty for any of the 
scientific statements which it tests; rather, these 
statements always retain the character of tentative 
hypotheses, even though their character of tentativeness 
may cease to be obvious after they have passed a great 
number of severe tests. (Popper [1957] 1994, 131)  
Popper provided an excellent summary of his position      
in footnote: 
 
“The opposition here pointed out, between deductivism and 
inductivism, corresponds in some respects to the 
classical distinction between rationalism and empiricism: 
Descartes was a deductivist, since he conceived all 
sciences as deductive systems, while the English 
empiricists, from Bacon on, all conceived the sciences as 
collecting observations from which generalizations are 
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obtained by induction. But Descartes believed that the 
principles, the premisses of the deductive systems, must 
be secure and self-evident – ‘clear and distinct’. They 
are based upon the insight of reason. (They are synthetic 
and a priori valid, in Kantian language.) As opposed to 
this, I conceive them as tentative conjectures, or 
hypotheses.”(Popper [1957] 1994, 131 footnote 2) 
 
Inductivists have generally remained unimpressed by 
Popper´s contention that science is deductive rather than 
inductive. Popper´s approach has been attacked by 
advocates of the objective Bayesian view who, following 
Cox (1961), point out that probability theory is 
inductive logic, and vice versa, and that the laws of 
probability are laws of inference. According to this 
view, it is not the function of induction to tell us 
which predictions are right; it is only when inductive 
inferences are wrong that new things about the real world 
will be learned. (see Jaynes 2003 passim; also Garrett 
1989) It has also been attacked by subjective Bayesians 
such as Howson and Urbach (2006) who argue that much of 
standard statistical practice, which is implicitly based 
on methodological falsificationism, should be abandoned.3               
 
With respect to economic methodology, it has been 
observed that economists rarely play the falsificationist 
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game consistently. (Hoover 2005, 12) Several authors have 
considered that no scientifically significant proposition 
has ever been decided on the basis of a statistical test 
and reject the falsificationist strategy altogether. 
(Summers 1991; Keuzenkamp and Magnus 1995) Where Blaug 
(1992) has called for a redoubled commitment to “serious” 
falsificationism, Keuzenkamp (2000) considers that both 
on the positive level, and on the normative level, the 
Popperian emphasis on falsification has done the 
reputation of econometrics much harm. 
As regards the causes of the non-falsifiability of 
theories in economics, attention has been drawn to the 
logical properties of the theory, in particular the use 
of parametric constants which are not numerical but 
algebraic magnitudes and of which it is assumed that they 
are in fact variable (Klant 1984, 155); and to the 
inapplicability of a “constancy principle” (Hoppe 2006); 
or simply to the absence of constants in economics (Hicks 
1979, 39; also Boland 1998).   
   
 
3. The Duhemian argument against falsificationism 
 
One of the most compelling cases against the 
possibility of the unambiguous falsification of 
individual scientific hypotheses has been based on a set 
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of ideas associated with the French physicist and 
historian of science, Pierre Duhem. (Duhem [1914] 1991)  
At the core of the thesis are two related ideas: 
non-separability, meaning that the empirical claims of 
hypotheses arise from conjunctions of hypotheses and 
background knowledge rather than from individual 
hypotheses taken in isolation; and unfocused refutation, 
in the sense that anomalous empirical evidence implies 
falsity somewhere in the conjunction of hypotheses and 
background knowledge under consideration, rather than 
necessarily implying that any particular hypothesis is 
false.4  
 
Pierre Duhem made the sound and useful point that 
the falsification of a scientific prediction is a highly 
ambiguous item of information. For if a group of 
scientific theories and auxiliary hypotheses T1, T2, ..., 
Tn collectively yield a prediction P that fails to be 
realized, then what we have is just the following pair of 
facts: 
 
(1) (T1 & T2 & ...& Tn) ⇒ P 
(2) -P 
 
And from this we can conclude: -(T1 & T2 &…&Tn). All that 
we have is that something is wrong somewhere within the 
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family: T1, T2, …,Tn. But we have no idea what is amiss; 
we can make no particular imputation of fault. The lesson 
is straightforward. When things go wrong with a 
prediction to which various theories contribute, we 
cannot tell specifically where to attribute the blame.  
Pierre Duhem formulated his thesis in the context of 
a philosophical reflection about the essential features 
of the experimental method in physics. Even in physics, 
he argued, the testing of theories is a great deal more 
complicated than the uncritical observer might imagine; 
“crucial experiments” are impossible. 
From the perspective of a correct understanding of 
the methodology of the sciences of human action, it is 
not at all obvious that the economist will confront the 
Duhem problem in his or her attempts to appraise economic 
theories. There are prima facie no reasons to believe 
that econometric modelling may serve as a substitute for 
the experimental method, which will allow the economist 
to conduct “crucial experiments” on the basis of which it 
can be expected to be possible to decisively refute and 
reject a particular theory, and to validate a different, 
rival theory or hypothesis.5  
Nevertheless empirical economists who advocate the 
use of econometric modelling methods will confront a 
Duhem problem of sorts, if only in virtue of the 
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impossibility to satisfy the unspecified ceteris paribus 
condition to which all economic predictions are subject.6  
This circumstance is related to the fact that 
economics – and macroeconomics in particular - have as 
their object of study systems that are not amenable to 
effective closure. No matter how many variables the 
macroeconomist includes in an explanans set, an 
indefinitely large number of potentially relevant 
variables are known to be left out.7 When a prediction 
turns out to be false, it might at first seem as if the 
situation as regards the general laws used in making it 
is indeterminate: it seems that it cannot be known with 
certainty whether one or all of the general laws have 
been disconfirmed or whether the ceteris paribus 
condition has not been fulfilled. In general, however, 
the confidence of economists in the simplifications and 
ceteris paribus assumptions will be much lower than their 
confidence in the basic laws, and thus the more likely 
explanation for the apparent disconfirmation will usually 
be a failure of the simplifications and ceteris paribus 
assumptions. This observation has led one author to 
conclude that economics is an “inexact and separate 
science” since “it becomes almost impossible to learn 
from experience”. (Hausman 1992a, 307)8  
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The praxeologist is confident, however, that this 
sad conclusion regarding the inexact nature of economic 
science can be avoided.9   
Not surprisingly, Popper has argued against the 
Duhem thesis. A critical examination of Popper´s critique 
is instructive. According to Popper, Pierre Duhem, in his 
famous criticism of crucial experiments, succeeds in 
showing that crucial experiments can never establish a 
theory. He fails to show, Popper contends, that they 
cannot refute it. (Popper [1963] 2002, 150 footnote 26) 
A first argument (Popper [1963] 2002, 324) is that, 
in axiomatized systems, counterexamples can be found by 
the practice of independence proofs, that is, proofs 
which show that certain axioms of an axiomatic system 
cannot be derived from the rest. The more simple of these 
proofs consist in the discovery of a model which 
satisfies all of the axioms except the one whose 
independence is to be shown. For this one axiom – and 
therefore for the theory as a whole – the model 
constitutes a counterexample. This point fails because 
Duhem is not referring to purely axiomatic systems, but 
to scientific theories in which theories are in some way 
linked to observational evidence. A second challenge 
(ibid. 151) is that scientists can take background 
knowledge and auxiliary assumptions as given, and regard 
anomalous evidence as refuting one or other of the 
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hypotheses which are the targets for testing. The 
suggestion is that if we take each of the two theories 
between which the crucial experiment is to decide 
together with all this background knowledge, then we 
decide between two systems which differ only over the two 
theories which are at stake. This argument fails because 
the “refutation” would still remain inconclusive in that 
the fault may lie in the background knowledge or 
auxiliary hypotheses taken as given. (Duhem [1914] 1991, 
216-18)10 
 
A third challenge is that scientists do 
invoke good reasons for changing specific components of 
their theoretical systems when confronted by refutations. 
(Popper 1983, 187 ff.) Thus, from the normative 
viewpoint, Lakatos reminds us that the sophisticated 
falsificationist will allow any part of the body of 
science to be replaced but only on the condition that it 
is replaced in a ‘progressive’ way, so that the 
replacement successfully anticipates novel facts. 
(Lakatos 1978, 99) This is not denied by the Duhem-Quine 
thesis. The point is that such refutations cannot 
logically force one to give up one component of the 
theoretical system rather than another. These reasons of 
good sense do not impose themselves with the same 
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implacable rigor that the prescriptions of logic do. 
(Duhem [1914] 1991, 217) 
   
 
4. The praxeological critique of falsificationism 
 
The precepts of Austrian methodology allow to 
sidestep Hausman´s sad conclusion that since empirical 
methods do not allow the economist to conduct “crucial 
experiments” in order to sift correct theories from false 
ones, it is not possible to learn from experience in 
economics. 
Neoclassical economists still by and large accept 
the positivistic thesis to the effect that no non-trivial 
part of economic theory could be of a synthetic a priori 
nature, thus implicitly or explicitly embracing a variant 
of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. The propositions of 
economics, according to this view, are inductive 
hypotheses, and the method of economics consists in the 
building of testable models, selection among which is 
effected, at least in principle, on the basis of relative 
predictive strength. Realism, according to this view, 
falls out of account as a criterion of theory selection. 
Austrian economists, in contrast, and while they do not 
contest the relevance of empirical and applied work, at 
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first attempt to grasp conceptually the basic categories 
in which the science of economics has its roots.11  
 
Austrians make a distinction between conception 
(theory) and understanding (history), while recognizing 
that historical understanding is the vital goal for which 
the theoretical construct of economics is to be employed. 
The entire purpose of theory is to aid the act of 
historical interpretation. 
Thus from an Austrian viewpoint historical facts 
cannot be used to “test” the truth of the theory. 
Economic theories cannot be “tested” by historical or 
statistical fact. These historical facts are complex and 
cannot, like the controlled and isolable physical facts 
of the scientific laboratory, be used to test theory. 
There are always many causal factors impinging on each 
other to form historical facts. Only causal theories 
derived a priori to these facts can be used to isolate 
and identify the causal strands.12 
The essence of Austrian methodology was briefly and 
brilliantly summarized by M. N. Rothbard in the 
Introduction to his America´s Great Depression. (Rothbard 
[1963] 1975) Considering how to gauge the results of 
economic policies, M. N. Rothbard refers to the 
circumstance that the “facts” will always underdetermine 
theory choice. He wrote: 
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“Suppose a theory asserts that a certain policy will cure 
a depression. The government, obedient to the theory, 
puts the policy into effect. The depression is not cured. 
The critics and advocates of the theory now leap to the 
fore with interpretations. The critics say that failure 
proves the theory incorrect. The advocates say that the 
government erred in not pursuing the theory boldly 
enough, and that what is needed is stronger measures in 
the same direction. Now the point is that empirically 
there is no possible way of deciding between them. Where 
is the empirical “test” to resolve the debate? How can 
the government rationally decide upon its next step? 
Clearly, the only possible way of resolving the issue is 
in the realm of pure theory - by examining the 
conflicting premises and chains of reasoning.”(Rothbard 
[1963] 1975, 4-5) 
 
Elsewhere Prof. Rothbard further clarifies: 
 
“This methodology begins with the conviction that while 
the economist, unlike the physicist, cannot test his 
hypotheses in controlled experiments, he is, in another 
sense, in a better position than the physicist. For while 
the physicist is certain of his empirical laws but 
tentative and uncertain of his explanatory 
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generalizations, the economist is in the opposite 
position. He begins, not with detailed, quantitative, 
empirical regularities, but with broad explanatory 
generalizations. These fundamental premises he knows with 
certainty; they have the status of apodictic axioms, on 
which he can build deductively with confidence.” 
(Rothbard 1979, 34)  
 
As one author has pointed out, the praxeological and 
Duhem-Quine positions possess the same implication for 
the idea of the “testability” of theoretical propositions 
in scientific work. (Boettke 1998, 538) As regards 
economics, this contention must be qualified, however. 
First, it can be pointed out that theoretical 
propositions in economics are unambiguously tested, 
namely in the praxeological thought experiment and in the 
process of ratiocination. As Prof. Rothbard aptly 
clarifies: 
 
“The nature of the evidence on which the praxeological 
axiom rests is, moreover, fundamentally similar to that 
accepted by the self-proclaimed empiricists. To them, the 
laboratory experiment is evidence because the sensory 
experience involved in it is available to each observer; 
the experience becomes “evident” to all. Logical proof is 
in this sense similar; for the knowledge that B follows 
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from A becomes evident to all who care to follow the 
demonstration. In the same way, the fact of human action 
and of purposive choice also becomes evident to each 
person who bothers to contemplate it; it is just as 
evident as the direct sense experience of the 
laboratory.” (ibid. 36-37) 
 
Thus logical proof is no less evidence than the 
direct sensory experience of the laboratory experiment. 
Valid (or correct) praxeological reasoning transmits 
truth from the premises to the conclusion. One of the 
basic tools for the deduction of the logical implications 
of the axiom of human action is the use of the 
Gedankenexperiment, or “mental experiment”. The 
Gedankenexperiment is the economic theorist´s substitute 
for the natural scientist´s controlled laboratory 
experiment. Since the relevant variables of the social 
world cannot actually be held constant, the economist 
holds them constant in his imagination. Using the tool of 
verbal logic, he mentally investigates the causal 
influence of one variable on another.  
Furthermore, if there exists any superficial analogy 
between the insights provided by the Duhem-Quine thesis 
on the one hand and praxeological methodological insights 
on the other, it is rather to be found in the context of 
that other major discipline dealing with human beings, 
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viz history. This discipline examines the applicability 
and relevance of particular theoretical propositions in 
particular historical contexts.  
As Ludwig von Mises had already pointed out, the 
economic historian is confronted with a somewhat 
analogous problem which is related to the use of 
judgments of relevance in historical research and their 
inevitability.  
The course of history is determined by the actions 
of individuals and by the effects of these actions. The 
actions are determined by the value judgments of the 
acting individuals, that is, the ends which they were 
eager to attain, and by the means which they applied for 
the attainment of these ends. The choice of the means is 
an outcome of the whole body of technological knowledge 
of the acting individuals. (Mises 1998, 49) It belongs to 
the preliminary work to be achieved by the historian to 
establish the facts that people were motivated by 
definite value judgments and aimed at definite ends. Then 
understanding must appraise the effects and the intensity 
of the effects brought about by an action; it must deal 
with the relevance of each motive and each action. (ibid. 
55) To every historical factor understanding tries to 
assign its relevance. (ibid. 57) 
The historian can enumerate all the factors which 
cooperated in bringing about a known effect and all the 
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factors which worked against them and may have resulted 
in delaying and mitigating the final outcome. But he 
cannot, except by understanding, assign to each of n 
factors its role in producing the effect P. Understanding 
is in the realm of history the equivalent, as it were, of 
quantitative analysis and measurement. (ibid. 56) In the 
realm of physical and chemical events there exist (or, at 
least, it is generally assumed that there exist) constant 
relations between magnitudes, and man is capable of 
discovering these constants with a reasonable degree of 
precision by means of laboratory experiments. No such 
constant relations exist in the field of human action. 
(ibid. 55)  
Mises´s most important conclusion with respect to 
historical understanding was that it “can never produce 
results which must be accepted by all men.”(Mises 1998, 
57) Two historians who fully agree with regard to the 
teachings of the non-historical sciences and with regard 
to the establishment of the facts as far as they can be 
established without recourse to the understanding of 
relevance, may disagree in their understanding of the 
relevance of these facts. They may fully agree in 
establishing that the factors a, b, and c worked together 
in producing the effect P; nonetheless they can widely 
disagree with regard to the relevance of the respective 
contributions of a, b, and c to the final outcome. As far 
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as understanding aims at assigning its relevance to each 
factor, it is open to the influence of subjective 
judgments. Of course, these are not judgments of value, 
they do not express preferences of the historian. They 
are jugdments of relevance. 
    
5. A closer look at Hayek´s view 
 
Hans Jörg Hennecke (2000, 83) contends that a 
prefiguration of Popper´s falsificationism can be found 
in Hayeks´s assertion that “[i]t is therefore only in a 
negative sense that it is possible to verify theory by 
statistics.” (Hayek [1933] 1966, p. 34)  
In the passage immediately preceding the previously 
quoted statement, Hayek writes: 
 
“It might be shown, for instance, by statistical 
investigation that a general rise in prices is followed 
by an expansion of production, and a general fall in 
prices by a diminution of production; but this would not 
necessarily mean that theory should regard the movement 
of price as an independent cause of movements of 
production. So long as a theory could explain the regular 
occurrence of this parallelism in any other way, it could 
not be disproved by statistics, even if it maintained 
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that the connection between the two phenomena was of a 
precisely opposite nature.” (Hayek ibid., pp. 33-4)  
 
Hayek further wrote: “Even as a means of 
verification, the statistical examination of the cycles 
has only a very limited value for Trade Cycle theory. For 
the latter-as for any other economic theory- there are 
only two criteria of correctness. Firstly, it must be 
deduced with unexceptionable logic from the fundamental 
notions of the theoretical system; and secondly, it must 
explain by a purely deductive method those phenomena with 
all their peculiarities which we observe in the actual 
cycles. Such a theory could only be ‘false’ either 
through an inadequacy in its logic or because the 
phenomena which it explains do not correspond with the 
observed facts. If, however, the theory is logically 
sound, and if it leads to an explanation of the given 
phenomena as a necessary consequence of these general 
conditions of economic activity, then the best that 
statistical investigation can do is to show that there 
still remains an unexplained residue of processes. It 
could never prove that the determining relationships are 
of a different character from those maintained by the 
theory.” (Hayek ibid., pp. 32-3) 
In footnote Hayek quotes from Pigou´s Industrial 
Fluctuations what has become the textbook proposition 
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that “correlation does not imply causation” (with the 
corollary that “the absence of correlation does not imply 
the absence of causation”): 
 
“The absence of statistical correlation between a given 
series of changes and industrial fluctuations does not by 
itself disprove-and its presence does not prove-that 
these changes are causes of the fluctuations.”(Hayek 
ibid., p. 31)  
 
It is not entirely useless to rehearse this 
otherwise well-known textbook truth, however. An 
economist of the caliber of Milton Friedman has on 
occasion declared the Austrian theory of the business 
cycle “wrong” on the basis of a supposed absence of any 
observed statistical correlation between the amplitude of 
expansions and the amplitude of the succeeding recessions 
(considered at a chosen, in particular too high a level 
of aggregation), which Dr. Milton Friedman considers 
“decisive refutation of von Mises”. (Hammond 1992, p. 
102; also 1996, passim)  
Besides the fact that working at too high a level of 
aggregation may actually tend to conceal rather than to 
reveal the most relevant relationships (Garrison 2001, 
224 ff.), in fact statistical studies will indeed tend to 
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establish the applicability (or the absence thereof) of a 
particular theory in a particular historical context: 
 
“(…) very complicated statistical investigations are 
needed to ascertain whether these circumstances whose 
presence indicates the applicability of theoretical 
conclusions were in fact operative.”(Hayek ibid., p. 37) 
 
According to Hayek the use of statistical studies is thus 
rather limited:  
 
“A priori we cannot expect from statistics anything more 
than the stimulus provided by the indication of new 
problems.” (Hayek ibid., p. 31)  
 
It remains true that “[o]ften statistical analysis may 
detect phenomena which have, as yet, no theoretical 
explanation, and which therefore necessitate either an 
extension of theoretical speculation or a search for new 
determining conditions.”(Hayek ibid., p. 37)  
 
There thus seem to be no compelling reasons for 
Austrians to reject econometric methods per se, provided 
the aspirations (and pretences) with respect to the 
possible accomplishments of these methods are 
appropriately tempered. The requirement that econometric 
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analysis should attempt to lead to the refutation (or the 
falsification) of established theories clearly reflects a 
too ambitious aspiration, and this will inevitably tend 
to damage the credibility of the whole econometric 
enterprise. Econometricians tend to search for adequate 
empirical representations of particular data. If 
econometricians are able to deliver useful approximations 
to empirical data, they achieve a major accomplishment.13   
Economists may disagree, for instance, about whether 
there was any significant credit expansion going on 
during a particular historical period, say, the (late) 
1920s. Only under conditions of such credit expansion is  
the Austrian theory of the business cycle deemed 
applicable. Austrians will thus point out that there is a 
crucial difference between contending that the empirical 
evidence with respect to this historical episode refutes 
(or falsifies) the theory of the business cycle on the 
one hand (which is deemed methodologically impossible), 
and the contention that this evidence substantiates the 
claim that the theory does not apply to the facts of this 
period (or that certain facts of this period are not 
explained by the theory), on the other hand (which is 
deemed methodologically possible but in casu factually 
false).14 Statistical investigations can indeed inform us 
about the applicability (or the absence thereof) of 
previously derived theoretical propositions. For the 
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Austrian economist, investigations of a conceptual, 
theoretical nature on the one hand and applied 
(statistical, historical…) research on the other thus 
always remain largely distinct cognitive acts.15 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The suggestion that Hayek, at the time he wrote 
Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, had independently 
arrived at a methodological position much akin to 
Popperian falsificationism cannot withstand critical 
analysis. The methodological view outlined by Hayek in 
the first chapter of Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle 
is actually more akin to the Misesian or praxeological     
view regarding the epistemological status of theoretical 
propositions. Even from the perspective of mainstream 
methodology, however, falsificationism remains more 
problematic than is often realized in view of the issues 
raised by the Duhem thesis, which falsificationists 
haven´t resolved satisfactorily.16 Even if it remains true 
that both lines of argumentation reject the Popperian 
emphasis on falsification for different reasons and from 
a different background, the prospects for 
falsificationism in economic methodology seem rather 
bleak.  
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Notes 
 
1
 We are here only concerned with the methodological views Hayek 
expressed as an economist, that is, the views he expressed at the 
time he engaged in business cycle research. There can be little doubt 
that Hayek´s methodological views evolved, arguably even 
considerably, during the remainder of his long career. It is commonly 
believed that Hayek´s methodological views evolved in a direction 
that made them more akin to those of his friend K. R. Popper. These 
issues are not considered here. Only Hayek´s early methodological 
views are considered. 
2
 In fact falsificationist methodology gives rise to several 
problems, such as (a) the characterization of the notion of 
truthlikeness and the conditions under which we may speak of 
increasing verisimilitude of our theories; (b) the specification of a 
possible measure of the “degree of corroboration”; (c) the issue of 
how to detect possible “immunizing stratagems” introduced “ad hoc” in 
order to save the concerned theory from falsification; and, last but 
not least, (d) the possibility of finding a convincing answer to the 
objection contained in the Duhem-Quine thesis. The latter issue is 
here considered in more detail.  
3 Trying to answer some of these objections, Gillies (1990) points 
out that it is unlikely that the standard methods of statistical 
testing will be given up. For a standard introduction to some 
conventional tests, see e.g. chapter 1 in Hayashi (2000).   
4
 This set of ideas is also known as the Duhem-Quine Thesis, because 
of a similar – and slightly stronger - thesis to be found in Quine´s 
Two Dogmas of Empiricism, reprinted in Quine ([1953] 1980, 20-46). 
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Here we find Quine´s famous statement that “our statements about the 
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually 
but only as a corporate body (…)” (ibid. 41) but also his stronger 
and more questionable claim that “any statement can be held true come 
what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the 
system (…)”. (ibid. 43)   
5 For a sensible defense of data mining by an author who states that 
“[t]o have created by data mining a regression with certain 
properties is not in itself to have discovered anything of 
significance about the world” (ibid. 251), see Hoover (1995). An 
interesting discussion of the methodology of econometrics, containing 
an overview of the main econometric approaches, is contained in 
Hoover (2005). 
6
 That any economic prediction is subject to a ceteris paribus 
assumption has also been recognized from a praxeological perspective.  
As Ludwig von Mises reminds us: “The assumption ceteris paribus is 
the self-evident appendage of every scientific doctrine and there is 
no economic law that can dispense with it.” (Mises 1981, 152) 
7
 An interesting analysis of the meaning of the Duhem-Quine Thesis in 
a macroeconomic context is contained in Cross (1982). 
8
 This author has argued from within a Bayesian framework that 
economic laws will be de facto nonfalsifiable. (1992a, 208; 1992b, 
64) Praxeological methodology offers a more principled argument 
against the falsifiability of economic laws. 
9
 See section 4 hereafter. It is interesting to note that Mises wrote 
with respect to the quantity theory: “Neither can any sort of 
refutation or limitation of the quantity theory be deduced from the 
fact that a number of writers claim validity for it only on the 
assumption ceteris paribus; not even though they state further that 
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this supposition never is fulfilled and never could be fulfilled.” 
(Mises 1981, 151-2) 
10
 Popper apparently envisages the following situation. When we are 
deciding between H1 and H2, we are comparing (A&B...&D) & H1 against 
(A&B...&D) & H2.  If the former entails X, while the latter does not, 
and a test gives not-X, then H1 is taken as falsified. Now one might 
contend that anyone is free to suspect that H1 is nevertheless true; 
Popper´s suggestion seems to be that in that case the work will shift 
to attempts to falsify (at least) one of “A, B,… D”. In other words, 
A is taken as a new H1 and the process is repeated, with our 
knowledge growing at each step. However, this is not the logic of 
falsification according to which it is possible to conclusively 
reject a particular hypothesis by purely deductive means alone. 
Nothing guarantees that each one of the separate hypotheses can be 
taken apart. Moreover, even if one would be somehow justified in 
taking H1 as falsified, it does not follow from this that H2 is 
thereby somehow corroborated. There may exist countless other 
hypotheses H3,…,Hn all of which are not contradicted by the evidence 
either but which are pairwise incompatible with H2. 
11 Certain differences between the views of the different 
protagonists of Austrian methodology and apriorism can be discerned, 
see e.g. the views expressed in Hoppe (1995), Huerta de Soto (1998), 
Smith (1996), among others. An elucidation of these differences may 
be instructive but falls outside the scope of this article. 
12
 At best it could be said that facts can test historical 
hypotheses, that is, hypotheses about the ways in which particular 
theoretical propositions are relevant in particular historical 
constellations of facts. In fact this is often what researchers are 
referring to when they talk about “facts testing theory”. But such 
hypotheses are not “theory” as the Austrian sees it. Theory always 
 31 
has a conditional, that is, an if-then structure. For instance, 
researchers could possibly disagree about whether there was policy-
induced malinvestment going on during the 1920s which rendered the 
boom ultimately unsustainable. This is a dispute concerning whether 
the Austrian theory of boom and bust applies to - and is relevant 
with respect to - a particular historical episode. The outcome of 
this discussion can never be a test of the theory itself, which only 
maintains that if there is policy-induced malinvestment etc., then, 
ceteris paribus, the resulting boom is unsustainable. A lot of 
research of a statistical and econometric nature is really about such 
questions of applicability and relevance and not about testing the 
fundamental propositions of economics. In other words, such research 
is, correctly interpreted, a contribution to historiography and not 
to economic theory. As such it is perfectly legitimate. 
13
 Keuzenkamp (2000, 159 ff. and passim). In particular, this author 
rightly expresses his scepticism regarding the claim that econometric 
modelling may serve as a substitute for the experimental method. On 
the other hand this author rejects apriorism. (ibid. 6-7) 
14
 That credit expansion and malinvestment indeed explain the 
unsustainability of the boom of the 1920s has typically been held by 
Austrian economists. In a recent paper, Eichengreen and Mitchener 
argue that the perspective provided by the credit-boom view is indeed 
a useful supplement to more conventional interpretations. 
(Eichengreen and Mitchener 2003) The suggestion, however, that the 
severity of the recession that followed the crisis was caused by the 
magnitude of the preceding credit (asset price) boom remains 
contested. It is widely believed that it was monetary policy failures 
that explain why the 1920s experience was followed by the greatest 
depression of all time; in other words, according to this 
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interpretation, it was the policy response after 1930 and not the 
credit boom that accounts for the severity of the bust. 
The exact role of the interwar gold standard remains equally subject 
to controversy. Econometric studies can help sort out these matters; 
however, the conclusion that the significant contraction of the money 
supply that accompanied the depression would have been impossible 
under a gold standard with a 100 percent reserve requirement – as has 
been consistently pointed out by the advocates of such an arrangement 
– follows from straightforward conceptual considerations. See also 
the comments by Michael D. Bordo and Charles Goodhart on the 
Eichengreen-Mitchener paper. (ibid. 82 ff.)  
15
 When Hayek uses the expressions “verification” and “corroboration” 
in this context, he really means that certain statistically 
established facts illustrate or exemplify the theory. Thus Hayek 
writes that “empirical studies (…) can, at best, afford merely a 
verification of existing theories; they cannot, in themselves, 
provide new insight into the causes or the necessity of the Trade 
Cycle.” (p. 27) “The reason for this is clear. The means of 
perception employed in statistics are not the same as those employed 
in economic theory; and it is therefore impossible to fit 
regularities established by the former into the structure of economic 
laws prescribed by the latter.” (p. 28) “Just as no statistical 
investigation can prove that a given change in demand must 
necessarily be followed by a certain change in price, so no 
statistical method can explain why all economic phenomena present 
that regular wave-like appearance which we observe in cyclical 
fluctuations.” (p. 30) ”The statistical approach, unlike deductive 
inference, leaves the conditions under which established economic 
relations hold good fundamentally undetermined; and similarly, the 
objects to which they relate cannot be determined as unequivocally as 
by theory. Empirically established relations between various economic 
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phenomena continue to present a problem to theory until the necessity 
for their interconnections can be demonstrated independently of any 
statistical evidence. The concepts on which such an explanation is 
based will be quite different from those by which statistical 
interconnections are demonstrated; they can be reached independently. 
Moreover, the corroboration of statistical evidence provides, in 
itself, no proof of correctness. (pp. 30-1)  
“In thus emphasizing the fact that Trade Cycle theory, while it may 
serve as a basis for statistical research, can never itself be 
established by the latter, it is by no means desired to deprecate the 
value of the empirical method. On the contrary, there can be no doubt 
that Trade Cycle theory can only gain full practical importance 
through exact measurement of the actual course of the phenomena which 
it describes. But before we can examine the question of the true 
importance of statistics to theory, it must be clearly recognized 
that the use of statistics can never consist in a deepening of our 
theoretical insight.” (pp. 31-2) “Thus it is not by enriching or by 
checking theoretical analysis that economic statistics gain their 
real importance. This lies elsewhere.”(p. 35) 
16
 It has been argued that the Duhem problem can be solved by 
Bayesian means. This conclusion can be related to the fact that 
evidence of the kind that refutes a test system may have a sharply 
asymmetric effect on the probabilities of the different components of 
this test system. For the Bayesian approach toward a solution of the 
Duhem problem, reference can be made to Dorling (1979); see also the 
discussion in Howson and Urbach (2006) 103 ff. and in Jeffrey (2004) 
35 ff.  
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